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INTRODUCTION 
tating that “the future of international law is domestic,”1 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White argue 
that international law is moving beyond regulating relations 
between sovereign states and toward directly influencing do-
mestic institutions by “strengthening [them], backstopping na-
tional governance, and compelling domestic action.”2 
The crime of genocide is a case in point: grounded in an in-
ternational treaty, it has compelled domestic courts to act. The 
1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide (“Genocide Convention” or “Convention”) was 
the first law to explicitly ban genocide,3 defined as “any [num-
ber of] acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”4 While the 
Genocide Convention was international, it had a strong domes-
tic component; it required states to both enact domestic legisla-
tion in conformity with its provisions5 and to prosecute geno-
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 1.  Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of Interna-
tional Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
327, 327 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 329. 
 3. Prior to the ratification of the Genocide Convention, German Nazi 
leaders were prosecuted for international crimes at the Nuremberg Trials 
between 1945 and 1946. Nuremberg Trials, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/topics/nuremberg-trials (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
At Nuremberg, the defendants were tried for crimes against peace (aggres-
sion), war crimes, and crimes against humanity; however, the defendants 
were not tried for genocidal acts committed during the Holocaust. Id.; see also 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 
6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
 4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Geno-
cide Convention]. For a comprehensive history of the Genocide Convention 
see SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE (2002). 
 5. See id. art. 5 (“[t]he Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accord-
ance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give 
S
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cide that took place within their territory.6 This was reasonable 
given that there was no permanent international criminal 
court at the time.7 The General Assembly also defeated a pro-
posal to recognize universal jurisdiction as a means to prose-
cute genocide in the Convention,8 which would have allowed 
states to prosecute genocide that took place outside of their ter-
ritory.9 
Although states were originally charged with the responsibil-
ity to prosecute the crime, domestic courts did not act for dec-
ades;10 several states were slow to join the Convention,11 and 
                                                                                                             
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to pro-
vide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide”). The Convention only 
requires domestic incorporation of the Convention in general terms and for 
states to determine punishment; it does not require that states incorporate 
the exact Convention definition of genocide. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 346–48 (2000). 
 6. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. 6 (“[p]ersons charged with 
genocide . . . shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territo-
ry of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction . . .”). 
 7. The permanent International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was established 
by the Rome Statute, which was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 
2002. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. While there was 
no permanent court when the Genocide Convention was established, the 
Convention did contemplate such a body. See Genocide Convention, supra 
note 4, art. 6. 
 8. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 100th mtg. at 406, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 
(Nov. 11, 1948). 
 9. See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (2001) (“universal jurisdiction is 
criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard 
to where the crime was committed, . . . the nationality of the victim, or any 
other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction”). 
 10. One notable exception was the prosecution of Nazi war criminal Adolf 
Eichmann for “crimes against the Jewish people,” which was the crime of 
genocide specifically against the Jewish people, under universal jurisdiction 
in Israel in 1961. See Hans W. Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal As-
pects, 1961 DUKE L.J. 400, 401 (1961). 
 11. Many states did not join the Convention until years after it entered 
into force. Of the current 144 parties, sixty-three joined after 1980; the Unit-
ed States did not ratify the Convention until 1988. Status of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
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many that joined did not enact municipal statutes criminaliz-
ing genocide, presumably working under the assumption that 
their treaty obligations or municipal laws criminalizing under-
lying offenses, such as murder, were sufficient.12 With the ex-
ception of a few domestic trials involving the prosecution of 
crimes similar to the internationally defined crime of geno-
cide,13 no one was convicted of the offense until 199814 when the 
ad hoc international tribunal, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, the 
mayor of a Rwandan town, for his role in the country’s 1994 
genocide of the Tutsi ethnic minority group.15 The ICTR has 
now ruled on seventy-five cases.16 In 2001, shortly after the 
ICTR’s Akayesu conviction, the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) made its first genocide 
conviction of the Serbian military officer Radislav Kristić, for 
the killing of Bosnian Muslims in the 1995 Srebrenica massa-
cre.17 The ICTY has now decided 136 cases.18 
                                                                                                             
1&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Status of the 
Genocide Convention]. 
 12. Jan Wouters & Sten Verhoeven, The Domestic Prosecution of Genocide, 
in ELEMENTS OF GENOCIDE 177, 177 (Paul Behrens & Ralph Henham eds., 
2013). 
 13. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Gen-
ocide, ‘The Crime of Crimes,’ in WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON 
THE DEATH PENALTY, JUSTICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 689, 689 n.3 (2008) [here-
inafter SCHABAS, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide] (not-
ing the trials of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in Cambodia in 1979, while also noting 
that these prosecutions were for crimes closer to the modern definition of 
crimes against humanity than to the definition of genocide). 
 14. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 286, 287 (1999). 
 15. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 734 (Sept. 
2, 1998), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pd
f. 
 16. Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visit-
ed Aug. 1, 2013) (most cases involve some genocide charge, but not all). 
 17. Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf. In the massacre, 
Serb forces killed more than 8000 Muslim men and boys in the town of Sre-
brenica in July 1995. Id. ¶ 84. 
 18. Key Figures of the Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFiguresoftheCases 
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Domestic courts have also prosecuted genocide more aggres-
sively in recent years.19 For example, domestic courts in Rwan-
da,20 Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina21 have been prose-
cuting individuals not prosecuted by the ICTR and ICTY. In 
addition, domestic Canadian22 and European courts have start-
ed to prosecute individuals for genocide offenses committed 
outside of their territory under universal jurisdiction.23 
In 2013, in a highly publicized case, Efraín Ríos Montt, the de 
facto leader of Guatemala from 1982–1983, was ordered to 
stand trial for genocide in Guatemala for the deaths of at least 
1771 Ixil Mayan people during the most violent period of the 
                                                                                                             
(last visited Aug. 1, 2013) (many cases involve genocide charges, but not as 
many as in the ICTR cases). 
 19. Kathryn Sikkink has referred to the general increase in prosecutions 
for international crimes as a “justice cascade.” KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE 
CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 
5 (2011). Sikkink finds “a dramatic new trend in world politics toward hold-
ing individual state officials, including heads of state, criminally accountable 
for human rights violations.” Id. According to Sikkink, “justice cascade means 
that there has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual crimi-
nal accountability for human rights violations and an increase in criminal 
prosecutions on behalf of that norm.” Id. 
 20. In 1996, Rwanda enacted Organic Law No. 08/96, which allowed do-
mestic criminal courts to prosecute genocide. Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication 
of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y, 125, 131 (2008). In 2001, the Rwandan government created 
special courts, called Gacaca courts, to prosecute genocide cases. Id. at 125. 
Domestic military tribunals have also prosecuted individuals responsible for 
genocide in Rwanda. Id. at 133. 
 21. See Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and Serbia and Montenegro, HUM. RTS. WATCH 3 (Oct. 14, 2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/node/11965/section/3. 
 22. See, e.g., Rwanda Genocide Refugee Acquitted at Canadian War Crimes 
Trial, TORONTO STAR (July 5, 2013), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/05/canadian_court_acquits_rwa
ndan_refugee_of_genocide.html; The World Prosecutes Rwanda’s Genocide, 
GLOBAL POST (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130621/the-world-prosecutes-
rwandas-genocide (“In 2009, a Rwandan militia leader, Desire Munyaneza, 
found guilty of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in Cana-
da’s first war crimes trial for his role in the genocide, was sentenced to life in 
prison.”). 
 23. See Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdic-
tion in Europe: 1998–2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927, 931–58 (2009). 
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country’s thirty-six-year-long civil war.24 The trial was historic; 
Ríos Montt became the first former head of state to be tried for 
genocide in his home country.25 James A. Goldston, executive 
director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, remarked, 
“[T]his first-ever domestic genocide trial of a former head of 
state is a high profile test of whether national courts and gov-
ernments, not just international tribunals, can fulfill their re-
sponsibility to pursue justice for grave crimes.”26 
This Article looks at that test and asks: should domestic 
courts prosecute genocide?27 The Article argues that domestic 
prosecution of genocide is not inherently negative or positive, 
but could further certain goals of international criminal justice 
at the expense of others because the “goals do not constitute a 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Elisabeth Malkin, In Effort to Try Dictator, Guatemala Shows New 
Judicial Might, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, at A1; Jo Tuckman, Former Gua-
temalan Dictator José Efraín Ríos Montt Goes on Trial, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/19/guatemalan-dictator-
jose-fran-rios-montt-trial. 
Prosecutors are hoping to prove that Ríos Montt must have been 
aware, and was consequently responsible for, a set of atrocities that 
resulted in the deaths of at least 1,771 Ixil Mayans in three towns in 
the country’s western highlands while he was head of the govern-
ment and counterinsurgency strategy. 
Id. 
 25. Trial Background, The Trial of Efrain Ríos Montt & Mauricio Rodri-
guez Sanchez, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.riosMontt-
trial.org/trial-background/ (last visited Jul. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Background: 
Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial]. 
 26. James A. Goldston, When Grave Crimes Elude Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/opinion/global/when-
grave-crimes-elude-justice.html (arguing that the role of domestic courts in 
prosecuting mass atrocity crimes is particularly important given that the ICC 
only convicted one individual in its first ten years). 
 27. This question is similar, although not identical, to the question posed 
above: should domestic courts prosecute crimes against humanity and/or war 
crimes? While this Article focuses on the crime of genocide, many prosecu-
tions for genocide include charges of crimes against humanity and/or war 
crimes. One significant difference between these crimes is that although the 
crime of genocide and laws of war are codified in international treaties (the 
Genocide and Geneva Conventions), a separate international treaty does not 
currently prohibit crimes against humanity. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes 
Against Humanity, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-
guide/crimes-against-humanity/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) However, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are all prohibited under the Rome 
Statute to the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 6–8. 
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harmonious whole; rather they pull in different directions.”28 
While the domestic prosecution of genocide (in the country 
where it occurred) better satisfies legal jurisdiction require-
ments and serves the goals of transitional justice, it may do so 
at the expense of traditional criminal justice goals (including 
victims’ rights) and defendants’ right to a fair trial and due 
process. The international community, including countries that 
have experienced genocide, should analyze the most important 
goals in prosecution in deciding whether to refer a case to the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), allow a foreign court to 
prosecute the crime, or prosecute the crime at home. 
Part I of this Article provides background on the Guatemalan 
Civil War and Efraín Ríos Montt’s role in the genocide of indig-
enous peoples during the war. Part II describes the various 
venues available for prosecuting genocide, including domestic 
and international courts, and explains the role that each has 
played in the Ríos Montt genocide case. Part III outlines the 
major issues in the domestic prosecution of genocide, especially 
in countries with developing judicial systems. These issues are 
divided into four categories: jurisdiction, defendants’ right to a 
fair trial and due process, goals of criminal justice, and goals of 
transitional justice. Within the context of these considerations, 
the Article examines the case of Efraín Ríos Montt—a case that 
illustrates benefits and drawbacks of domestically prosecuting 
genocide. Part IV suggests ways to mitigate the tension be-
tween competing goals of justice in the prosecution of interna-
tional crimes such as genocide. 
I. THE GUATEMALAN CIVIL WAR, GENOCIDE, AND EFRAÍN RÍOS 
MONTT 
The modern history of Central America, from roughly the end 
of World War II to the end of the Cold War, was strongly influ-
enced by the United States and its anti-communist foreign pol-
icy. During this period, Central America “was afflicted by long 
civil wars based on ideology and several military interventions 
by . . . the United States.”29 
                                                                                                             
 28. Mirjan R. Damaska, What Is the Point of International Criminal Jus-
tice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 331 (2008). 
 29. ARIE M. KACOWICZ, ZONES OF PEACE IN THE THIRD WORLD: SOUTH 
AMERICA AND WEST AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 183 (1998). 
570 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
Guatemala in particular experienced the longest regional civ-
il war, which lasted thirty-six years (1960–1996) and took the 
lives of more than 200,000 Guatemalans.30 The war began six 
years after the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”)-sponsored overthrow of democratically elected leftist 
president Jacobo Árbenz in 1954,31 a “turning point in Guate-
malan history.”32 The United States saw the Árbenz regime’s 
agrarian reform program, which expropriated some lands held 
by U.S. companies, as a threat to its commercial interests.33 
Furthermore, it viewed Árbenz as “‘soft’ on communism” and 
therefore perceived him as “a threat to U.S. security” interests 
as well.34 Colonel Carlos Castillo, leader of a U.S.-friendly au-
tocratic military junta, replaced Árbenz in a coup.35 Castillo 
was assassinated in 1957, and different military leaders ruled 
Guatemala in the late 1950s and early 1960s.36 
In 1960, left-wing Guatemalan military officers launched a 
failed revolt after the Guatemalan government allowed the CIA 
to use Guatemalan territory to train Cuban exiles for the Bay 
of Pigs invasion.37 The surviving rebels retreated to the hills 
and formed the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre 
(“MR-13”) insurgency, which later merged with the Guatema-
lan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo or “PGT”) 
to form the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes or 
“FAR”).38 
In the late 1960s, the Guatemalan government, with U.S. 
military assistance, launched counterinsurgency attacks 
against rebels throughout the country.39 Julio César Méndez 
                                                                                                             
 30. E. BRADFORD BURNS & JULIE A. CHARLIP, LATIN AMERICA: A CONCISE 
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 300 (7th ed. 2002). 
 31. See id. at 243, 300. 
 32. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 352 
(5th ed. 2001). 
 33. Id. at 349–50. 
 34. Id. at 351. 
 35. Id. at 352. 
 36. Id. 
 37. BURNS & CHARLIP, supra note 30, at 301. 
 38. See SUZANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATEMALA: REBELS, DEATH 
SQUADS, AND U.S. POWER 66–67 (1991). 
 39. Douglas Farah, Papers Show U.S. Role in Guatemalan Abuses, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 11, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/daily/march99/guatemala11.htm (“During the 1960s, the United 
States was intimately involved in equipping and training Guatemalan securi-
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Montenegro, president of Guatemala from 1966–1974, led the 
government campaign with brutal tactics, and the Mano Blan-
ca (“White Hand”), a paramilitary death squad, targeted gov-
ernment dissidents.40 The leftist revolutionaries “initially ob-
tained the support of some indigenous Maya, who viewed the 
guerillas as the last hope for redressing the economic and polit-
ical marginalization of the indigenous communities.”41 This led 
the government forces to conclude that Mayan communities 
were “natural allies” of the insurgents and, therefore, “enemies 
of the state.”42 Government military strategists also “added rac-
ist fears, amplified by Guatemala’s apartheid-like social sys-
tem, that Mayans were easily manipulated by outsiders . . . or 
that their participation in the insurgency was driven by a de-
sire for racial vengeance.”43 
The conflict between guerilla insurgencies and the govern-
ment continued throughout the 1970s, 44  and the guerilla 
groups united under the Revolutionary National Unity of Gua-
temala (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca or 
“UNRG”) in 1982.45 Repression by government forces increased 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and the conflict radicalized.46  Ríos 
Montt came to power in a 1982 military coup, launching the 
National Plan of Security and Development (Plan Nacional de 
Seguridad y Desarollo or “PNSD”), which, by claiming a strong 
link between national security and development, called for the 
                                                                                                             
ty forces that murdered thousands of civilians in the nation’s civil war, ac-
cording to newly declassified U.S. intelligence documents.”). 
 40. BURNS & CHARLIP, supra note 30, at 301; see Declassified Intelligence 
Note of U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala: A Counter-Insurgency Running Wild? 
(Oct. 23, 1967), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc05.pdf. 
 41. Guatemala: Silent Holocaust: The Mayan Genocide, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & 
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=294 (last 
visited July 3, 2013). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Greg Grandin, Politics by Other Means: Quatemala’s Quiet Genocide, in 
QUIET GENOCIDE, GUATEMALA 1981–1983, at 1, 9–10 (Etelle Higonnet ed., 
Marcie Mersky trans., 2009). 
 44. See Background on Guatemala, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, 
http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=294 (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 45. Quines Somos (“Who We Are”), UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL 
GUATEMALTECA [GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY NATIONAL UNITY, UNRG], 
http://www.urng-maiz.org.gt/quienesomos.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 46. See Grandin, supra note 43, at 7. 
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“extermination of subversive elements.”47 From 1982 to 1983, 
“the bloodiest period in Guatemala’s history,” the military 
launched operations in 626 Mayan villages.48 During these op-
erations, government forces systematically raped, tortured, and 
murdered thousands of civilians and destroyed hundreds of vil-
lages as part of a “scorched earth” campaign.49 The vast majori-
ty of the civilians killed in the campaigns were indigenous Ma-
yans.50 
In 1983 Ríos Montt was pushed out of power in another mili-
tary coup and replaced by General Mejía Victores. 51  Under 
pressure from the international community, Mejía Victores al-
lowed a gradual transition to democracy, holding elections for a 
Constituent Assembly and drafting a Constitution.52 He also 
issued Decree 8-86, which granted amnesty for political crimes 
committed between 1982 and 1986.53 A civilian, Vinicio Cerezo, 
was elected president in 1985.54 He was succeeded by a number 
of civilian leaders, including de León Carpio and Álvaro Arzú,55 
who engaged in U.N.-backed peace talks with the UNRG.56 
The year 1996 marked the official end to the Civil War with 
the signing of peace accords and the passage of the National 
Reconciliation Law. 57  This law granted amnesty for many 
crimes committed during the war,58 but crimes of genocide were 
                                                                                                             
 47. Timeline of Events: The Trial of Efrain Ríos Montt & Mauricio Rodri-
guez Sanchez, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.riosMontt-
trial.org/trial-background/timeline-of-events/ (last visited Jul. 3, 2013) [here-
inafter Timeline: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial]. 
 48. Guatemala: Silent Holocaust: The Mayan Genocide, supra note 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Timeline: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial, supra note 47. 
 52. See Constitutional Limits on Government: Country Studies—
Guatemala, DEMOCRACY WEB, 
http://www.democracyweb.org/limits/guatemala.php (last visited Dec. 1, 
2013). 
 53. Timeline: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial, supra note 47. 
 54. Guatemala: Civil War Years, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/701217/Guatemala/272510/Civil-
war-years#ref468098 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 55. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 32, at 353. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Decreto No. 145, 27 December 1996, Ley de Reconciliación Nacional 
[National Reconciliation Act], 54 DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA (Guat.). 
 58. Id. art. 2. 
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explicitly excluded.59 In 1999, the U.N.-sponsored truth com-
mission, the Commission for Historical Clarification, published 
its final report, which concluded that the Guatemalan state 
“committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people” 
during Ríos Montt’s rule.60 It also found that state security 
forces committed 93% of the documented human rights viola-
tions.61 
II. PROSECUTING GENOCIDE: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 
Following the signing of the peace accords and conclusion of 
the Civil War, indigenous and human rights groups cam-
paigned to bring the Guatemalan leaders responsible for geno-
cide to justice.62 The Guatemalan case demonstrates the vari-
ous venues available for the prosecution of genocide and their 
complications in the modern international legal system. Courts 
that could potentially prosecute genocide include domestic 
courts exercising universal jurisdiction, the ICC, ad hoc courts 
(e.g., the ICTY and ICTR), hybrid courts, or domestic courts 
exercising territorial and/or personal jurisdiction. The Ríos 
Montt case started as a universal jurisdiction case in Spain and 
eventually was tried in a Guatemalan court with territorial 
and personal jurisdiction. Notably, charges against Ríos Montt 
for genocide have been pursued exclusively in domestic courts. 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. art. 8 (“The termination of criminal responsibility in this law will 
not apply to crimes of genocide”) (translation by author). 
 60. COMISIÓN PARA EL EXCLARECIMIENTO HISTÓRICO [COMM’N FOR 
HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, CEH], GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE, ¶ 122 
(1994), available at 
http://shr.aaas.org/projects/human_rights/guatemala/ceh/mos_en.pdf (“[T]he 
CEH concludes that agents of the State of Guatemala, within the framework 
of counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 1983, commit-
ted acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people.”). 
 61. Id. ¶ 15. 
 62. In addition to individual criminal charges (the focus of this Article), a 
complaint was filed against the state of Guatemala in the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in 1996. See Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment on Pre-
liminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 27 (July 2, 1996). In 
2004, the court found that Guatemala was liable for a massacre in a Mayan 
village in 1982 and ordered the state to pay compensation to victims and 
their families. See Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 105 (Apr. 9, 2004). 
574 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
A. Domestic Courts, Universal Jurisdiction 
In 1999, a group led by indigenous Guatemalan Nobel Peace 
laureate Rigoberta Menchú brought the first charges for geno-
cide against Ríos Montt and other former high-level Guatema-
lan officials (known as the “Guatemala Genocide Case”) in do-
mestic Spanish courts under universal jurisdiction. 63  Spain 
adopted a universal jurisdiction law in 1985, which authorized 
domestic courts to try genocide crimes (and other serious 
crimes prohibited by international treaty) without a territorial 
or personal link to Spain.64 In the Guatemala Genocide Case 
the trial judge ruled that the Spanish court had jurisdiction on 
the basis of the severity of the crimes alleged.65 Furthermore, 
“the judge noted that several of the victims were Spanish or 
had died on Spanish territory.”66 “[T]he judge [also] introduced 
a notion of ‘subsidiarity’ into the case—the idea that universal 
jurisdiction is required and justified when domestic courts have 
failed to address a particular matter themselves.”67 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that universal jurisdic-
tion could not be exercised without a “connecting nexus” to 
Spain.68 The court therefore found that investigations could be 
pursued only into the charges of attacks against Spanish citi-
zens, and not into terrorism and genocide charges against in-
digenous Mayans. 69  On the issue of subsidiarity, the court 
found that “national courts should not be making judgments 
[on another state’s ability to administer justice], which could 
                                                                                                             
 63. Rigoberta Menchu et al. v. Ríos Montt et al. (“Guatemala Genocide 
Case”), Complaint, ASSER INSTITUTE, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN LAW, 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Spain/Guatemala
_Complaint_02-12-99.pdf (last visited Jul. 4, 2013). 
 64. Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Organic Law of the Judicial 
Power] art. 23(4)(a) (B.O.E. 1985, 6) (Spain), as amended by Ley Orgánica del 
Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Organic Law of the Judicial Power] art. 1 (B.O.E. 
2009, 1) (Spain). 
 65. Kaleck, supra note 23, at 956. 
 66. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, International Decisions—Guatemala Genocide 
Case, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 208 (2006) [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Interna-
tional Decisions] (noting that in 1980 the “Spanish ambassador was injured 
and several embassy employees were burned to death in a firebombing attack 
on [the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City]”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Kaleck, supra note 23, at 956. 
 69. Roht-Arriaza, International Decisions, supra note 66. 
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have an important effect on foreign relations and should [there-
fore] be left to the political branches.”70 
In September 2005, the Spanish Constitutional Court re-
versed the Supreme Court’s decision, finding that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction was appropriate.71 The Spanish Con-
stitutional Court then issued arrest warrants for several sus-
pects, including Ríos Montt, in 2006.72 In 2007, the Guatema-
lan Constitutional Court dismissed the charges, finding that 
the Spanish court’s exercise of universal jurisdiction violated 
Guatemala’s sovereignty. 73  Although Spanish courts never 
tried Ríos Montt or other former Guatemalan officials,74 the 
Spanish courts took testimony from victims and experts be-
tween 2008 and 2009.75 
B. The International Criminal Court, Ad Hoc and Hybrid 
Courts 
International ad hoc and hybrid tribunals and the ICC did 
not play a role in the Guatemala case. Because the alleged gen-
ocide crimes were committed well before the Rome Statute en-
tered into force in 2002,76 referral to the ICC was not an option 
in the Ríos Montt case. 77  It is unclear whether Guatemala 
would have referred the case to the ICC even if it were possi-
ble.78 However, the country did become a state party to the 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. at 208-09. 
 71. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Alumdena Bernabeu, The Guatemalan Geno-
cide Case in Spain, BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUD., Fall 2008, 
http://www.cja.org/downloads/Guatemala_U.C.Review_fall08.pdf. 
 72. Kaleck, supra note 23, at 956–57. 
 73. Id. at 957. 
 74. Spanish courts cannot try individuals in absentia. The Spanish Na-
tional Court, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, 
http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=342 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 75. Background: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial, supra note 25. 
 76. See Rome Statute, supra note 7. 
 77. Under the legal principles nulla peona sine lege and non-retroactivity 
ratione personae, established in the Rome Statute, the court can “punish only 
in accordance with this Statute” and “[n]o person shall be criminally respon-
sible . . . for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.” Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 7, arts. 23–24. 
 78. At the time the charges were brought, the president of Guatemala, 
Otto Perez Molina, was a retired military officer and potentially implicated in 
genocide crimes committed during counterinsurgency operations in Mayan 
villages in the 1980s. See Mica Rosenberg & Mike McDonald, Special Report: 
New Guatemala Leader Faces Questions about Past, REUTERS, Nov. 11, 2011, 
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Rome Statute in 2012,79 giving the ICC complimentary jurisdic-
tion80 over any genocide that is perpetrated in Guatemalan ter-
ritory after 2012.81 The presence of the U.N.-sponsored truth 
commission in the 1990s “showed that the United Nations was 
familiar with conditions in Guatemala and that it had never-
theless not decided to create an ad hoc tribunal along the lines 
of those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.”82 In the 2000s, 
the U.N. established hybrid tribunals for Sierra Leone (this 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over genocide),83 
East Timor, and Cambodia.84 The U.N. notably did not estab-
lish a tribunal for Guatemala. 
C. Domestic Courts in Guatemala: The Recent Trial of Ríos 
Montt 
While the universal jurisdiction case in Spain stalled, chang-
ing conditions in Guatemala made domestic prosecution possi-
ble there.85 First, in 2006, Guatemala established the Interna-
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-guatemala-perez-
idUSTRE7A93OP20111110. 
 79. Guatemala became a state party to the ICC on April 2, 2012. States 
Parties—Chronological List, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/states%20parties%20_%20chro
nological%20list.aspx (last visited June 9, 2013). 
 80. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, pmbl. (“[T]he International Criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complimentary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.”); Markus Benzing, The Complimentary Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State 
Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 592, 
592 (2003) (“The [International Criminal] Court is only meant to act when 
domestic authorities fail to take the necessary steps in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes enumerated under Article 5 of the Statute.”). 
 81. Under the principle of “jurisdiction ratione temporis,” established in 
the Rome Statute, the ICC may, generally, only exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes committed after the statute’s entry into force for the state in question. 
Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 11(2). 
 82. Roht-Arriaza, International Decisions, supra note 66, at 209. 
 83. SCHABAS, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, supra 
note 13, at 694. 
 84. See David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 2 (2007). 
 85. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Genocide and War Crimes in National Courts: 
The Conviction of Ríos Montt in Guatemala and Its Aftermath, AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/14/genocide-and-war-crimes-
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tional Commission Against Impunity (Comisión Internacional 
contra al Impunidad en Guatemala or “CICIG”) to target high-
level officials in international criminal trials.86  Through the 
organization, the U.N.-trained Guatemalan lawyers and judg-
es.87 Second, during the presidency of Álvaro Colom from 2008 
to 2012, the military’s control over domestic institutions de-
clined.88 Third, Guatemala’s Attorney General Claudia Paz y 
Paz, who had a strong background in international criminal 
law, showed a willingness to prosecute Ríos Montt.89 Finally, 
Ríos Montt lost immunity from prosecution, which he had en-
joyed from 2007 to 2012 as a member of Congress.90 
Because the Spanish court had already collected a body of 
testimony and evidence, the prosecution could begin its case 
with a solid foundation.91 In January 2012, Attorney General 
Paz y Paz indicted Ríos Montt for genocide and other charges, 
including torture, terrorism, and crimes against humanity.92 A 
Guatemalan judge ordered Ríos Montt and former army intelli-
gence chief Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez “to stand trial for gen-
ocide and crimes against humanity” in January 2013. 93  In 
                                                                                                             
national-courts-conviction-rios-Montt-guatemala [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, 
National Courts]. 
 86. Nicholas Casey, Guatemala Ex-Dictator’s Genocide Trial a Test for 
Justice, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873235510045784370138
56080192. 
 87. Id. For further background on the activities of the Comisión Internac-
ional contra al Impunidad en Guatemala (“CICIG”), see Learning to Walk 
Without a Crutch: An Assessment of the International Commission Against 
Impunity in Guatemala, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-
america/36%20Learning%20to%20Walk%20without%20a%20Crutch%20—-
%20The%20International%20Commission%20Against%20Impunity%20in%2
0Guatemala.pdf. 
 88. Lauren Carasik, Justice Postponed in Guatemala, BOS. REV. (May 28, 
2013), http://www.bostonreview.net/world/justice-postponed-guatemala. 
 89. See Background: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial, supra note 
25. 
 90. Profile: Guatemala’s Efrain Ríos Montt, BBC NEWS (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22486387. 
 91. See Background: Ríos Montt & Rodriguez Sanchez Trial, supra note 
25. 
 92. Guatemala National Court Genocide Prosecution Against Ríos Montt, 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/article.php?id=1280 (last 
visited July 9, 2013). 
 93. Id. 
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March 2013, the trial for Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez 
began.94 
“The chief strategy of Ríos Montt’s defense team was not to 
engage in a substantive debate about the past, but rather to 
stall the proceedings and prevent them from reaching a conclu-
sion.”95 On the first day of trial (March 19th), Ríos Montt en-
tered court without his longtime lawyers, Danilo Rodríguez and 
Francisco Palomo, but instead with a new lawyer, Francisco 
García Gudiel, who said he had only joined the defense that 
morning.96 García Gudiel asked for a delay to familiarize him-
self with the case, but the three-judge panel headed by Judge 
Yasmin Barrios refused.97 In response, García Gudiel declared 
the judge biased and repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of 
the courts.98 Eventually, he was expelled from the courtroom by 
Barrios.99 César Calderón, Rodríguez Sanchéz’s lawyer, repre-
sented Ríos Montt for the remainder of the day.100 The court 
stated that Ríos Montt could have any lawyer besides García 
Gudiel represent him the next day.101 
Ríos Montt’s primary substantive defense was that the “mas-
sacres were excesses ordered by field commanders” and that he 
had no knowledge of the attacks.102 Rodríguez Sanchéz’s law-
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. 
 95. Jo-Marie Burt & Geoff Thale, The Guatemala Genocide Case: Using the 
Legal System to Defeat Justice, WASH. OFFICE OF LATIN AM. (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.wola.org/commentary/the_guatemala_genocide_case_using_the_le
gal_system_to_defeat_justice. 
 96. Emi MacLean, Trial Opens with Statements, Prosecution Witnesses, 
After Defense Challenges Rejected, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/03/trial-opens-with-prosecution-
witnesses-after-defense-challenges-rejected/ [hereinafter MacLean, Trial 
Opens]. 
 97. Peter Canby, The Maya Genocide Trial, NEW YORKER BLOG (May 3, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/05/the-maya-
genocide-trial.html; Emi MacLean, Trial Opens, supra note 96. 
 98. Emi MacLean, Trial Opens, supra note 96. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Burt & Thale, supra note 95. 
 102. Malkin, supra note 24. Under the Geneva Conventions, superiors could 
be absolved from liability for breaches by their subordinates if they did not 
have any knowledge of a breach. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of In-
ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 86(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
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yer, César Calderón, also argued that his client “did not have 
command responsibility for the alleged crimes.” 103  Over the 
next several weeks, Ríos Montt’s original lawyers returned and 
claimed that because of the events on the first day of trial 
(when García Gudiel was expelled), their client’s fair trial and 
due process rights had been violated.104 The court heard testi-
mony from defense experts about peace agreements, the mili-
tary chain of command, and the internal insurgency.105 Accord-
ing to one courtroom observer, “[a]s soon as the defence lawyers 
obtained their own translators, they made generous use of lan-
guage issues to interrupt and confuse the witnesses, and to de-
liberately raise incendiary issues which had not been men-
tioned by the witness.”106 
On the fifth day of the trial (March 25th), one of Ríos Montt’s 
original lawyers, Danilo Rodriguez, reappeared and asked to 
again represent his client, a request that the court granted.107 
On the sixth day (March 26th), Ríos Montt’s defense team 
made three challenges to Judge Barrios’ oversight of the tri-
al.108 Attorney Marco Antonio Cornejo, one of Ríos Montt’s at-
                                                                                                             
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was 
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from pe-
nal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or 
had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the 
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to 
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures 
within their power to prevent or repress the breach. 
Id. 
 103. Emi MacLean, Trial Opens, supra note 96. 
 104. Burt & Thale, supra note 95. 
 105. Emi MacLean, Day Two: Ríos Montt Representation, and Prosecution 
Testimony, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/03/day-two-rios-Montt-representation-
and-prosecution-testimony/. 
 106. Elisabeth Patterson, The Ríos Montt Trial—Have Efforts Been Made to 
Integrate the Mayan Perspective?, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/elisabeth-patterson-the-rios-
Montt-trial-have-efforts-been-made-to-integrate-the-mayan-perspective/. 
 107. Emi MacLean, ‘They Came Only to Kill’: More Testimony on Massacres 
as Outside Protest Claims No Genocide Occurred, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/03/they-came-
only-to-kill-witnesses-inside-describe-massacres-while-protesters-outside-
deny-that-there-was-genocide-on-day-5-of-rios-Montt-trial/. 
 108. Emi MacLean, Judge again Rejects Defense Calls for Her Recusal and 
Suspension of Trial; 11 More Prosecution Witnesses Heard before Easter Re-
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torneys, argued that Judge Barrios should withdraw from the 
proceedings because of a civil complaint against her for expel-
ling García Gudiel from the court on the first day of the trial.109 
The judge held that the motion was without merit and witness-
es were able to continue their testimony.110 
The prosecution then presented Ixil Mayans who witnessed 
the acts of the Guatemalan military in 1982 and 1983; a great 
number of the witnesses were children at the time of the mili-
tary campaign and presented emotional testimony.111 On the 
tenth day of the trial (April 4th), a witness testified that the 
current president of Guatemala, Otto Pérez Molina, had or-
dered soldiers to loot villages and execute people that fled.112 
Experts from the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Founda-
tion testified with detailed information on exhumations of mas-
sacre sites.113 Experts also testified about the history of the 
conflict, peace accords, and the international law involved.114 
Later in the trial, one expert testified that 18.3% of the indige-
nous population was killed from 1979 to 1986, which was com-
parable to the 20% of the targeted population killed in geno-
cides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.115 
After the prosecution finished presenting their case, the de-
fense claimed to have twelve witnesses; however, only two ar-
                                                                                                             
cess, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.riosMontt-
trial.org/2013/03/judge-again-rejects-defense-calls-for-her-recusal-and-
suspension-of-the-trial-11-more-prosecution-witnesses-heard-before-easter-
recess/. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Shawn Roberts, Day 10: Witness Implicates President Perez Molina in 
Massacres, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/day-10-witness-implicates-president-
perez-molina-in-massacres/. 
 113. Shawn Roberts, Day 11 of Ríos Montt Trial: Forensic Experts Testify 
Regarding Exhumations, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/day-11-of-rios-Montt-trial-forensic-
experts-testify-regarding-exhumations/. 
 114. See Matt Eisenbrant, Prosecution Experts Testify on Psychological, 
Cultural, Statistical and Gender Issues, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 
13, 2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/prosecution-experts-testify-
on-psychological-cultural-statistical-and-gender-issues/. 
 115. Id. 
2014] PROSECUTING GENOCIDE 581 
rived at the court.116 One witness testified that the defendants 
could not have had detailed knowledge about the actions of the 
military during the conflict.117 The head of a humanitarian or-
ganization during the war testified that that the army did try 
to help indigenous populations, and that these indigenous 
groups were not the target of military operations but were 
merely caught in the middle of a civil war.118 The next day, the 
defense claimed to have ten witnesses, but once again only two 
arrived.119 Both of these witnesses reiterated the defense’s ar-
gument that the aims of the army were more politically and 
militarily, rather than ethnically, motivated, and that the gov-
ernment established programs to help indigenous popula-
tions.120 
On the fourteenth day of the trial (April 18th), following de-
fense testimony, defense attorney Rodríguez stated that the 
trial court had to abide by an April 3rd ruling by the Guatema-
lan Constitutional Court (“Constitutional Court”) that ordered 
certain previously excluded defense documents admitted. 121 
Rodríguez argued that this ruling should have stopped the en-
tire trial and that the trial was unjust before storming out of 
the courtroom.122 That day, Judge Carol Patricia Flores from 
the Court of First Instance ruled that the trial could not pro-
ceed based on this ruling and the trial was thus annulled.123 
                                                                                                             
 116. Kate Doyle, As Trial Nears Conclusion, Defense Witnesses Absent and 
Hearing Cut Short, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/as-trial-nears-conclusion-defense-
witnesses-absent-and-hearing-cut-short/. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Kate Doyle, Day 19 of Ríos Montt Trial: Defense Continues to Avoid 
Presentation of Proposed Expert Witnesses as Trial Comes to a Close; Closing 
Arguments Planned, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/day-19-of-rios-Montt-trial-defense-
continues-to-avoid-presentation-of-proposed-expert-witnesses-as-trial-comes-
to-a-close-closing-arguments-planned/. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Kate Doyle, Day 20: Defense Attorneys Walk Out of Trial in Protest; 
Preliminary Court Judge Annuls Trial as Attorney General Calls Action Ille-
gal and Promises Legal Challenge, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/day-20-defense-attorneys-walk-
out-of-trial-in-protest-preliminary-court-judge-annuls-sentence-as-attorney-
general-calls-action-illegal-and-promises-legal-challenge/. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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The trial stalled until the following week, when the Constitu-
tional Court ruled in favor of the defense on several legal chal-
lenges and further instructed Judge Flores to order the trial to 
resume with the newly admitted evidence.124 At this point, a 
web of legal challenges complicated the trial: 
(1) the adequacy of Ríos Montt’s representation on the first 
day of the trial; (2) determinations by a pre-trial judge on the 
admissibility of evidence; (3) a decision by a different pre-trial 
judge that the entire trial should be annulled; and now, (4) 
whether a recusal motion must be fully considered, and ap-
pealed, before the trial can continue.125 
The trial resumed and both sides made closing statements.126 
Ríos Montt addressed the court and declared his innocence in a 
thirty-minute statement.127 He reiterated many of the points 
made by his defense team and declared, “I never authorized, I 
never proposed, I never ordered acts against any ethnic or reli-
gious group.”128 On May 10th, the three-judge panel found Ríos 
Montt “guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity” and 
sentenced him to eighty years in prison.129 Rodríguez Sanchez 
was found not guilty on the ground “that he did not have com-
mand responsibility.”130 The court found that Ríos Montt had 
command responsibility and that Ixil Mayan civilians were 
targeted for killing and rape.131 
                                                                                                             
 124. Lisa Laplante, Lower Judge Complies with Constitutional Court Order; 
Trial May Re-start Next Week, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 27, 2013), 
http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/04/lower-court-judge-complies-with-
constitutional-court-order-trial-may-re-start-next-week/. 
 125. Jo-Marie Burt, Trial Court Reopens but Adjourns Quickly as Defense 
Lawyer Is a No-Show; Constitutional Court Issues Three Judgments, OPEN 
SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (May 8, 2013), http://www.riosMontt-
trial.org/2013/05/trial-court-reopens-but-adjourns-quickly-as-defense-lawyer-
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 126. Jo-Marie Burt, Historic Genocide Trial Nears End; Ríos Montt Ad-
dresses the Court, Declares Innocence, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (May 10, 
2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/05/historic-genocide-trial-nears-
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 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Jonathan Birchall, Open Society Justice Initiative Welcomes Conclu-
sion of Historic Ríos Montt Trial, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE (May 11, 
2013), http://www.riosMontt-trial.org/2013/05/476/. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The Court released its full 718-page opinion a week after the verdict, 
for which an index of eleven PDF files is available. Index of 
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However, just days later, on May 20th, the Constitutional 
Court ruled 3-2 to overturn the verdict and sent the trial back 
to April 19th, meaning any testimony or evidence presented 
after that point would not be valid.132 The decision was made 
on the basis that Francisco García Gudiel had been expelled 
from the courtroom, which left Ríos Montt without an attorney 
on the first day.133 Dissenting judges Mauro Chacon and Gloria 
Porras criticized the remedy as “disproportionate.”134 The fol-
lowing week, the Constitutional Court said it would also con-
sider whether a 1986 amnesty law barred prosecution of Ríos 
Montt.135 In June 2013, the Constitutional Court was still con-
sidering several legal issues related to the case and assigned a 
new trial court to hear the case in April 2014.136 In November 
2013, the court announced that the trial would not begin until 
January 2015, further stalling any final verdict.137 Following 
the announcement, lawyers for the Ixil Community filed a 
complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights “to condemn . . . Guatemala for the impunity for crimes 
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of genocide.” 138  In February 2014, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the Attorney General who brought the charges 
against Ríos Montt, Claudia Paz y Paz, must step down seven 
months before her term was to expire.139 
III. ISSUES IN DOMESTIC PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE: 
JURISDICTION, DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS, AND THE GOALS OF 
CRIMINAL AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The domestic prosecution of genocide, such as the trial of Ríos 
Montt and other former high-level Guatemalan officials, raises 
several legal issues including jurisdiction, the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial and due process, goals of criminal justice, and 
goals of transitional justice. The following section analyzes 
each of these issues to determine whether the domestic prose-
cution of genocide can meet international legal standards, and 
whether domestic prosecution of genocide is more likely to ad-
vance or hinder major goals of international criminal justice 
than prosecution by international tribunals. While the analysis 
focuses on the Guatemala case, it also draws on other exam-
ples. 
A. Jurisdiction 
In order to prosecute genocide, a court—domestic or interna-
tional—must have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction is 
“[t]he power and authority constitutionally conferred upon . . . 
a court or judge to pronounce the sentence of the law, or to 
award the remedies provided by law.”140 There are two primary 
conceptions of how international law can come under domestic 
court jurisdiction—“monist” and “dualist” theories. In “monist” 
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states, domestic courts automatically have jurisdiction over in-
ternational law, while in “dualist” states international law 
must be transferred into domestic code before a domestic court 
can have jurisdiction. 141  A major objection to prosecuting a 
crime before it has been established in international or domes-
tic law is retroactivity, or nulla crimen sine lege (“no crime 
without law”), a cornerstone of democratic governance and hu-
man rights law142 that “rests on the political truth that if a law 
can be created after an offense, then power is to that extent ab-
solute and arbitrary.”143 
Many states that ratified the Genocide Convention incorpo-
rated genocide directly into their domestic codes, giving them 
jurisdiction over genocide that occurs within their territory un-
der either a monist or dualist conception and eliminating ret-
roactivity concerns.144 Guatemala is one such state. Guatemala 
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168 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
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nize that this prohibition may not apply when crimes violate “the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations,” which almost cer-
tainly include genocide. See ICCPR, supra, art. 15(2); European Convention, 
supra, art. 7(2). 
 143. Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Prece-
dent, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-
a-dangerous-precedent/306492/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
 144. Wouters & Verhoeven, supra note 12, at 180. 
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ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950145 and enacted Arti-
cles 376 (criminalizing genocide) and 377 (establishing the pun-
ishment for genocide) of the domestic penal code in 1973.146 
Guatemala is thus an example of a state that took the best pos-
sible action by ratifying the Genocide Convention early and 
criminalizing genocide within its penal code. In a domestic 
prosecution of genocide that occurred between 1982 and 1983, a 
Guatemalan court’s jurisdiction is not open to reasonable chal-
lenge. 
However, other states did not ratify the Genocide Conven-
tion, or ratified the Convention but did not incorporate the law 
into their domestic code, thus exposing themselves to jurisdic-
tion and retroactive application problems.147 Article V of the 
Convention, which requires states to enact necessary legisla-
tion to implement the Convention, could serve as evidence that 
the treaty was not intended to be self-executing.148 Further-
more, the Genocide Convention does not set out a punishment 
for genocide, which would require a court to impose a retroac-
tive punishment for the crime.149 States might impose penalties 
already established in domestic criminal codes for the underly-
ing offenses (such as murder). However, punishing underlying 
offenses could compromise recognition of the severity for the 
particular crime of genocide.150  In particular, underlying of-
fenses may not be punishable (for example, “public incitement 
of genocide” may not have a punishable underlying offense), 
and domestic statutes of limitations could bar prosecution of 
the underlying offenses (especially considering many genocide 
crimes are prosecuted years or even decades after they take 
place). 
The problem of not incorporating genocide into the domestic 
code arose in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Although 
the killing of 800,000 people, primarily of the Tutsi ethnic mi-
                                                                                                             
 145. Status of the Genocide Convention, supra note 11 (listing Guatemala as 
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temalan Penal Code] arts. 376, 377, available at 
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 148. Wouters & Verhoeven, supra note 12. 
 149. See Genocide Convention, supra note 4. 
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nority, in a matter of months clearly met the definition of geno-
cide set out in the Convention,151 and Rwanda had acceded to 
the Convention in 1975,152 it did not ratify a domestic statute 
criminalizing genocide. Rwanda enacted legislation criminaliz-
ing genocide in 1996153 and established local gacaca courts in 
2001, in which both the absence of pre-established punishment 
and the fact that Rwanda had ratified several Conventions out-
lawing genocide were mentioned in the text of the law.154 While 
Rwanda was still able to establish punishment for genocide be-
cause of the nature of the crimes committed in 1994,155 it had to 
rely on a retroactive statute rather than established law, which 
would have given it a stronger legal basis for prosecution.156 
These examples demonstrate the need for countries to ratify 
the Genocide Convention and incorporate the crime into their 
domestic statute to avoid jurisdictional and retroactivity chal-
lenges. Although the prohibition on genocide is widely consid-
ered customary international law because it violates “general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations,”157 
and even jus cogens,158 legal complications remain when seek-
                                                                                                             
 151. See id. at 696. 
 152. Status of the Genocide Convention, supra note 11. 
 153. See Sosnov, supra note 20. 
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ing prosecution without ratification of relevant treaties and in-
corporation into domestic codes with defined punishment.159 
In both the Guatemalan and Rwandan examples, domestic 
courts had a territorial link to the crime, giving them a strong 
claim for jurisdiction. Without a territorial or personal link, a 
domestic court might still assert “universal jurisdiction”160 over 
the international crime of genocide. Many countries have ac-
cepted universal jurisdiction.161 Furthermore, “[u]niversal ju-
risdiction over genocide . . . has come to be widely treated as an 
accepted feature of customary international law.”162 Arguments 
in favor of universal jurisdiction are that the crimes committed 
“are so grave they harm the entire international community” 
and that such prosecution ensures that there are no safe ha-
vens for international criminals.163 
Still, universal jurisdiction is less widely accepted than terri-
torial or personal jurisdiction.164 Major criticisms of universal 
jurisdiction include that it is “potentially quite expansionist 
and subject to abuse . . . [by allowing] a small group of nations . 
. . to prosecute officials from other nations based on their par-
ticular conception of customary international law.”165 Further-
more, the legitimacy of a court taking action against a person 
who “cannot be said to have in any way authorized the exercise 
of [the full power of the state] through nationality or conduct 
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2014] PROSECUTING GENOCIDE 589 
within the state’s territory” could also interfere in the internal 
affairs of another sovereign state.166 
In recent years, domestic Canadian and European courts 
have been active in exercising universal jurisdiction to prose-
cute genocide crimes. The following individuals have been con-
victed of genocide and genocide-related offenses: Bosnian Serb 
Nikola Jorgić (Germany, 1997), 167  Rwandan Fulgence Ni-
yonteze (Switzerland, 1999),168 Rwandan businessman Étienne 
Nzabonimana and his half-brother Samuel Ndashyikirwa (Bel-
gium, 2005),169 former Rwandan army general Bernard Ntuya-
haga (Belgium, 2007),170 Rwandan Désiré Munyaneza (Canada, 
2009), 171  Rwandan pastor François Bazaramba (Finland, 
2010), 172  Dutch-Rwandan Yvonne Besabya (Netherlands, 
2013), 173  Swedish-Rwandan Stanislas Mbanenande (Sweden, 
2013),174 and Rwandan Sadi Bugingo (Norway, 2013).175 France 
began its first genocide trial for former Rwandan army captain 
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Pascal Simbikangwa in 2013.176 Notably, Austrian courts tried 
(but did not convict) Bosnian Serb Duško Cvjetković in 1995.177 
A general survey of universal jurisdiction genocide cases shows 
a recent increase in domestic universal jurisdiction prosecu-
tions, with several countries, including Sweden, Norway, and 
France, holding their first-ever genocide trials in the past 
year.178 
In what is likely the most high-profile universal jurisdiction 
case in modern history, Spanish courts indicted former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet for crimes including genocide, terror-
ism, and torture in 1998.179 The Pinochet case inspired action 
by human rights groups bringing charges against Ríos Montt in 
1999.180 These cases and the recent wave of domestic genocide 
prosecutions in Canada and Europe demonstrate the reach and 
limits of universal jurisdiction as a means to prosecute geno-
cide. 
First, concerning the limits, there was significant disagree-
ment among Spanish courts over what was required to invoke 
universal jurisdiction, which held up the Guatemalan Genocide 
Case for several years.181 The highest court, the Constitutional 
Tribunal, held that the case could be prosecuted under univer-
sal jurisdiction.182 However, Spain’s Supreme Court held that 
domestic courts only have jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed against their citizens.183 In 2009, Spain re-
vised its universal jurisdiction statute to require that the de-
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fendant be present in Spain, the victims be Spanish,184 or there 
be some other connection to Spain.185 Currently, the Spanish 
Parliament is considering legislation to even further limit uni-
versal jurisdiction. 186  Similar universal jurisdiction-limiting 
legislation was passed in Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom.187 As a result, many domestic courts exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction are now requiring a “plus” factor (e.g., a pas-
sive personality factor)188 that the defendant be present in the 
forum country or that the defendant previously lived in that 
country.189 
Another limit of universal jurisdiction is that a defendant 
may not be extradited for trial when he or she is not present in 
the forum state. This limitation was illustrated in the Guate-
malan Genocide Case when even after an investigation was 
opened against the defendants and warrants were issued for 
their arrest, the Guatemalan court did not accept the authority 
of the ruling and refused to grant Spain’s extradition re-
quest.190 Many of the domestic prosecution cases involve indi-
viduals present in the forum country.191 Universal jurisdiction 
can still be useful in eliminating safe havens for individuals 
who flee their home countries to escape prosecution; the de-
fendant’s presence in another country can give that country a 
jurisdictional link to prosecute his or her crimes. 
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While the Guatemalan Genocide Case shows the boundaries 
of universal jurisdiction, it also demonstrates its power. Even if 
a court exercising universal jurisdiction is unable to secure a 
conviction or extradite suspects, its power may lie in its ability 
to gather evidence and testimony and bring attention to a 
crime, which may eventually induce domestic courts to take 
action.192 While defendants (including Ríos Montt) were never 
brought to Spain to stand trial, the court “yielded witness and 
expert testimonies and military documents, some of which were 
then introduced into evidence in the Guatemalan trial.”193 The 
indictment and arrest warrants for Guatemalan suspects also 
brought considerable attention to the issue and influenced the 
eventual domestic prosecution.194 
Finally, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide that occurs in 
any state,195 given the state is party to the Rome Statute196 and 
domestic courts are not actively prosecuting the crime them-
selves.197 The Guatemalan Genocide Case shows that it may 
take time for the ICC to become effective. Because many of the 
world’s genocide crimes were committed before the court was 
created, the ICC cannot have a role in the prosecution of those 
crimes.198 The result is that the true need for such a court to 
prosecute genocide may not be known for many years. 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that domestic 
courts with a territorial or personal link to the crime (e.g., the 
Guatemalan court that prosecuted Ríos Montt) have the 
strongest case for jurisdiction over genocide. Universal jurisdic-
tion is still controversial and evolving; however, universal ju-
risdiction “plus” seems to be another promising means by 
which to prosecute individuals who try to evade justice by flee-
ing to foreign countries. Courts exercising universal jurisdic-
tion can also play the important role of catalyst for, and aid to, 
an eventual domestic prosecution. Further, the ICC’s jurisdic-
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tion over genocide is dependent on ratification of the Rome 
Statute, a relatively new institution, and is also intended to be 
complementary to domestic jurisdiction. In terms of jurisdic-
tion, then, domestic courts should prosecute genocide, but ex-
ternal domestic and international courts should also be pre-
pared to step in when necessary to fulfill the international 
community’s legal obligations. 
B. Defendants’ Rights to a Fair Trial and Due Process 
Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, 
said: “You must put no man on trial if you are not willing to . . . 
see him freed if not proven guilty. . . . [T]he world yields no re-
spect to courts that are merely organized to convict.”199 Today, 
the right to a fair trial is recognized as a universal human right 
for criminal defendants in numerous international human 
rights treaties. Major elements of a fair trial under interna-
tional standards include the presumption of innocence,200 right 
to a public trial,201 right to legal counsel,202 right to examina-
tion of evidence and witnesses,203 and right to appeal.204 In ad-
dition to these rights, the international and political nature of 
genocide prosecution raises general due process concerns.205 
One concern is the prosecution of an individual by the group 
against which genocide is alleged, which is likely to violate a 
defendant’s fair trial and due process rights. The domestic gen-
ocide prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 arguably 
could have violated Eichmann’s fair trial and due process 
rights because he was tried in a country founded by members 
of the religious and ethnic group (Jewish) against whom he was 
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charged with genocide.206 However, this may have been the on-
ly available option for the prosecution at the time. In this way, 
the development of international and domestic courts with uni-
versal jurisdiction allows adjudication by a third party, provid-
ing a significant advancement for genocide prosecution by end-
ing impunity while mitigating real or perceived violations of a 
defendant’s due process rights. This criticism is not as relevant 
to the Ríos Montt case because he was not tried in a court sub-
stantially controlled by the group against whom he was 
charged with genocide (indigenous Mayan groups), 207  but it 
could be important in future domestic genocide prosecutions. 
In addition to ethnic, religious, or racial bias in domestic 
courts, “[t]he lack of judicial independence in many countries  
. . . [threatens] the prospect of impartiality and due process, 
particularly in politically charged cases.”208 This criticism is 
particularly relevant to the Ríos Montt trial and in other coun-
tries with developing or transitional legal systems. Ríos Montt 
showed a lack of respect for, and deference to, the judicial pro-
cess.209 The political nature of genocide prosecution, especially 
with former high-level officials, makes an impartial domestic 
trial much less feasible than a trial by an international tribu-
nal. Ríos Montt had powerful allies within Guatemala—he was 
a member of Congress merely one year earlier—210 that intimi-
dated prosecutors, witnesses, and judges.211 During the trial, 
paid advertisements ran in Guatemala linking judges, lawyers, 
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and activists involved in the trial with guerillas, and stating 
that the peace process would be undone if Ríos Montt were 
convicted.212 While the right to a fair trial and due process are 
a defendant’s right, it shows the general impact a domestic tri-
al could have on judicial impartiality. While political influence 
undermines the overall fairness and credibility of the trial, do-
mestic political bias is also relevant to victims’ rights and the 
goals of criminal justice. 
Domestic prosecutions may also violate due process rights if 
they substantially alter accepted requirements for internation-
al criminal liability for genocide, because they “would fail to 
fulfill the . . . requirements that the criminal law be non-vague, 
specific, and prospective in its application.”213  The Genocide 
Convention protects four groups: national, ethnic, racial, and 
religious groups. 214  However, many countries have enacted 
genocide laws that either add groups not included in the Geno-
cide Convention or omit groups protected by the Genocide Con-
vention.215 Groups that various states have added to their do-
mestic genocide statutes include political, social, and class 
groups.216 
Guatemala enacted its domestic genocide code in line with 
three of the four groups enumerated in the Genocide Conven-
tion (excluding race),217 and indigenous Mayan groups clearly 
fit under the “ethnic” category. However, the original Guatema-
lan Genocide Case in Spain included a claim that the govern-
ment intended to eliminate a specific “national” group with a 
particular political ideology.218 The same charges were alleged 
against Pinochet and Argentine defendants in earlier universal 
jurisdiction cases.219 The domestic Spanish genocide law per-
tained to “national ethnic, religious, or social group[s],” which 
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was “different from the Genocide Convention in two crucial re-
spects: first, there was no comma between the words ‘national’ 
and ‘ethnic’, and second, the term ‘social’ replaced the term ‘ra-
cial’ group.”220 This approach has been criticized as not meeting 
international standards. 221  Courts in Argentina accepted an 
interpretation of genocide that applied to crimes committed by 
the government against political opponents during the coun-
try’s “Dirty War,”222 which has been also criticized as incon-
sistent with international law.223 On the positive side, domestic 
judges applying international law can “participate in [a] global 
judicial dialogue [that can] enhance their own legitimacy and 
create a sphere in which they are seen to operate within a legal 
rather than a political context.”224 However, if domestic inter-
pretations stray too far from accepted international principles, 
due process rights could be violated and may impermissibly ex-
pand international criminal liability, “creating inconsistent and 
incoherent doctrine.”225 
Another concern about the domestic prosecution of severe in-
ternational crimes is the degree to which domestic courts ad-
here to international standards for a fair trial. According to 
Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, components of a competent 
judiciary include “well-crafted statutes; . . . a trained cadre of 
judges, prosecutors, defenders, and investigators; . . . court-
room facilities; . . . [and] a culture of respect for the fairness 
and impartiality of the process and the rights of the ac-
cused.”226 In Rwanda, domestic gacaca courts were set up in 
2001 to try a large number of individuals.227 These courts were 
criticized by international human rights groups for not meeting 
basic fair trial standards, as “[j]udges . . . [were] chosen by 
community election; they [were] given minimal training in 
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criminal law, serve[d] without pay, and [could] impose sentenc-
es ranging up to 30 years’ imprisonment.”228 There were also 
allegations of widespread bribery and corruption in the system 
and “a number of witnesses and gacaca court officials [were] 
killed across the country, often in a brutal manner.”229 Con-
cerns over fair trials in these local courts were so great that 
European states including France and the U.K. refused to ex-
tradite individuals to Rwanda where they would be subject to 
trial. 230  Although similar concerns exist regarding courts in 
Guatemala,231 they may not be as severe as those surrounding 
Rwanda. Ironically, Ríos Montt’s defense team in Guatemala 
compromised the integrity of the process by using due process 
as a justification for filing numerous frivolous legal challeng-
es.232 
The ICC, ICTY, ICTR, and other international tribunals have 
incorporated international fair trial standards into their found-
ing statutes. However, other bias issues still exist in these fo-
rums. International tribunal staff, many of whom have a strong 
ideological dedication to ending international crime (“interna-
tional legal idealists”), “may be inclined to presume guilt, to 
view convictions as more important than process, and to base 
charging decisions more on potential impact than on evi-
dence.” 233  Furthermore, because international courts hear 
many cases related to the same event (such as a massacre), 
they “may thus be biased or perceived as biased when it has 
already adjudicated facts central to the later defendant’s crim-
inal responsibility.”234 Additionally, there may be political pres-
sure on international courts that depend on state funding to 
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produce convictions.235 Finally, the prosecutor in international 
criminal courts may find it much easier than the defendant to 
gain access to witnesses and evidence from state govern-
ments.236 Thus, while international courts’ “provisions and . . . 
practice . . . require these courts to aspire to the highest stand-
ards set by international human rights treaties, customary in-
ternational law, and general principles of law,”237 they contain 
inherent biases that could compromise the right to a fair trial. 
With regard to a defendant’s right to a fair trial and due pro-
cess concerns, domestic courts should maybe prosecute geno-
cide, depending on what due process guarantees and domestic 
political influence are present in the trial. In terms of a fair tri-
al and due process, a foreign domestic court exercising univer-
sal jurisdiction should prosecute genocide. This is because 
these courts (such as European courts) are likely to have devel-
oped legal systems that follow international fair trial and due 
process standards, while at the same time being more physical-
ly and politically disconnected from the crimes. Domestic courts 
exercising universal jurisdiction are also less likely to be com-
posed of “international legal idealists” and may be less politi-
cally influenced than international criminal courts; “[d]omestic 
judges and law clerks are used to remaining neutral and even-
handed in less public and sensational cases.”238 
C. Goals of Criminal Justice 
Justifications for criminal punishment in the domestic sphere 
include deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
and condemnation.239 These goals can be seen as the flip side of 
a defendant’s rights; they capture both victims’ rights to justice 
and the right of society to condemn crime. The goals of incapac-
itation and rehabilitation are less likely to apply at the inter-
national criminal level.240 However, other central goals of crim-
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inal justice, such as deterrence, retribution, and condemnation, 
are particularly relevant to international criminal law and the 
Guatemala case. 
Scholars have asked whether international criminal justice 
can deter future mass atrocities, with varying degrees of confi-
dence that it can.241 Assuming at least a marginal deterrent 
effect, would deterrence be greater if genocide were prosecuted 
in domestic or international courts? The answer depends on 
which courts have the greatest powers to convict and incarcer-
ate perpetrators, since there will be no deterrence without 
feared penalty. The Ríos Montt example suggests that interna-
tional courts, or domestic courts exercising universal jurisdic-
tion, may do a better job at deterrence, especially in politically 
charged cases, because “national courts are frequently subject 
to political manipulation, particularly in transitional socie-
ties.”242 Due to Ríos Montt’s national political influence, he has 
been able to delay prosecution for several years, with trial set 
to begin again in January 2015 at the earliest. 243 If perpetra-
tors of genocide believe they will be prosecuted within their 
country, they may also believe that enough political influence 
can keep them out of jail, thus minimizing any possible deter-
rent effect. 
Alternatively, Stephanos Bibas and William Burke-White ar-
gue that “[l]arger, speedier domestic systems are much better 
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at deterring and incapacitating. International criminal justice . 
. . should instead emphasize punishing as well as healing the 
wounds of atrocities.”244 This analysis, however, compares in-
ternational criminal justice, generally, with the domestic pros-
ecution of traditional domestic crimes. The study of the domes-
tic prosecution of international crimes, such as genocide, sug-
gests that complications in international justice do not stem 
just from the forums of international justice (e.g., international 
courts), but also from the nature of international crimes them-
selves. While domestic prosecution of traditional crime is gen-
erally better at deterrence than international criminal justice, 
the case of Ríos Montt suggests that international courts might 
provide greater deterrence than domestic courts. However, hav-
ing both forums available would be best; the greater number of 
forums available for prosecution, the greater the deterrent ef-
fect on potential perpetrators because of the higher likelihood 
that some court will prosecute them. 
Prosecuting a crime in a domestic court could offer greater 
retribution for victims in the home country to be in control of 
the process. As José Alvarez argues, “local justice is more ac-
cessible, more compatible with community expectations, and  
. . . may present greater opportunities for control over . . . pro-
ceedings.”245 At the same time, the conviction necessary for ret-
ribution and condemnation could be more likely in a court with 
a more developed judicial system. For example, in the Guate-
mala case, Ríos Montt’s defense team was able to sabotage the 
prosecution with “litigio malicioso, roughly translated as un-
ethical legal tactics. . . . Such behavior is not unprecedented in 
Guatemala; the frivolous and improper use of legal motions . . . 
is well-documented.”246 “Endless appeals, shopping for friendly 
justices, and seeking to delay verdicts and sentencing are clas-
sic techniques of those seeking to avoid justice in Guatemala,” 
according to Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington 
Office for Latin America.247  An unequivocal “guilty” verdict, 
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even if by an international court, could have sent a clear mes-
sage and provided greater retribution (through seeing Ríos 
Montt incarcerated). 
Prosecuting genocide in a foreign court with universal juris-
diction, especially in instances where the crime occurred in a 
country with a developing judicial system, could better address 
the goals of traditional criminal justice. This is because a for-
eign court with universal jurisdiction is less likely to be directly 
politically influenced by the defendant and will have stronger 
institutional capacity to convict an individual. While interna-
tional courts have certainly acquitted individuals, the defense 
tactics used by the defense in the Ríos Montt case would not 
have been possible in an international court. Because the goals 
of punishment depend on a conviction in a court of law, inter-
national courts could better meet traditional goals of criminal 
justice. 
Thus, with regard to traditional goals of traditional justice, 
domestic courts should not prosecute genocide, and interna-
tional courts (or those exercising universal jurisdiction) should 
prosecute genocide. Still, domestic prosecution should remain 
an option to increase deterrence, a major goal of traditional 
criminal justice, by eliminating jurisdictions of impunity. 
D. Goals of Transitional Justice 
This Article has focused on traditional criminal law issues: 
jurisdiction, defendants’ rights, and goals of punishment. How-
ever, this analysis alone overlooks the fact that genocide is not 
just an international crime, but also a historical event with 
deep political and social implications. The emerging field of 
transitional justice addresses these issues in the context of in-
ternational law. As Ruti Teitel explains, “[t]he role of criminal 
justice in transitional times . . . transcends that of conventional 
punishment . . . [and] advances other purposes that are partic-
ular to political change.”248 
The tools and goals of transitional justice are distinct from, 
and overlap with, the traditional criminal justice goals de-
scribed in the previous section. “The tools of transitional justice 
include trials, truth commissions, reparations, apologies, and 
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purges.”249 The major goals of transitional justice include estab-
lishing truth, providing a forum for victims, holding perpetra-
tors accountable, strengthening rule of law and institutional 
structures, and promoting societal restoration and reconcilia-
tion.250 “Transitional justice requires a balance of liberal com-
mitments and political precautions.”251 
Establishing the truth is an essential component of transi-
tional justice and has been a major goal of victims and human 
rights advocates in Guatemala.252 The U.N. had already estab-
lished a truth commission in Guatemala in the 1990s, which 
issued an extensive report on documented human rights abuses 
and international crimes committed during the civil war.253 For 
this reason, truth seeking may have not have been a primary 
goal of the genocide trial. Still, a trial could provide greater 
truth-seeking power, especially as some “castigated [the U.N. 
truth commission in Guatemala] as too weak, with a scope too 
confined to incidents surrounding armed conflict and powers 
too frail to authorize subpoenas or to name in its final report 
those individuals responsible for the wrongdoing.”254 Further-
more, additional information may come to light after a truth 
commission has concluded and can be presented in a subse-
quent prosecution. In a country that has not utilized other tools 
of international transitional justice similar to the truth com-
mission, domestic prosecution of genocide could provide a valu-
able forum for establishing the truth. 
In terms of establishing truth, then, domestic prosecution in 
the country where the genocide occurred is the best forum. The 
court has easier access to witnesses. During the Ríos Montt tri-
al more than 100 witnesses and experts testified to events that 
occurred during the Civil War,255 creating a significant histori-
cal record. The greater the opportunity for full community par-
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ticipation, the greater the possibility for hearing a wide range 
of testimony and establishing the truth. Furthermore, the court 
is closer to relevant evidence and documents. For example, in 
2005, investigators discovered an archive of the Guatemalan 
National Police that contained detailed information on murders 
and disappearances not available when the Truth Commission 
made its findings.256 The proximity of the Guatemalan court to 
evidence and witnesses increased the truth-finding power of 
the court. 
Domestic courts are also better suited to meet the needs of 
restorative justice because of their ability to have a more direct 
impact on the society where the crimes took place. The Guate-
malan case demonstrates the restorative benefits of holding the 
trial in a domestic court as opposed to an international or for-
eign court. For example, in the first ever “rape as a crime 
against humanity” case at the ICTY (an international court), 
“thirty-eight women detained in rape-camps told their stories 
to the ICTY, the people of Foča [the town in southern Bosnia 
where the crimes occurred] were isolated from the events of the 
trial and largely unable to personally benefit from the proceed-
ings.”257 By contrast, in the 2013 domestic Guatemalan case, 
victims of sexual violence testified in their home country.258 Ac-
cording to local human rights groups, the “trial . . . marked a 
turning point for rape survivors, breaking the taboo of [discuss-
ing] sexual violence used as a weapon of war.”259 Alejandra 
Castillo, assistant director of the Guatemalan Human Rights 
Legal Action Centre, explained: 
[In Guatemala,] [a]fter women suffered sexual violence, they 
were often rejected by their communities and not accepted 
back. There’s still stigma attached to sexual violence. But 
talking about it during the trial has paved the way for more 
dialogue and initiatives to combat high levels of sexual vio-
lence that still exist in Guatemala today. It’s a step for-
ward.260 
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The trial also “allowed members of the Ixil community to tell 
their stories before a national audience for the first time,” 
which indigenous groups said was restorative and could help 
others understand their struggles.261 
Holding the trial in Guatemala engaged Guatemalan society 
in public dialogue and activism. The trial was covered heavily 
in the Guatemalan media, 262  and civil society groups, both 
those in support of and in opposition to Ríos Montt, held pro-
tests throughout the trial at the courthouse and at the prison 
where Ríos Montt was incarcerated.263 Public deliberation is 
necessary in a transitional society, and the domestic trial in 
Guatemala provided a forum for citizens to engage and express 
their opinions about the past regime and about the judicial and 
political future of their country. 
Furthermore, the issuing of a guilty verdict in the trial sent a 
clear transitional message about military actions during the 
Civil War. While the Constitutional Court overturned the May 
10th verdict, the decision was based on a legal technicality ra-
ther than on the substance of the evidence against the defend-
ant.264 The verdict was, therefore, still significant in showing 
leadership culpability and judicial condemnation of acts of gen-
ocide during the Civil War. Even in the absence of a final con-
viction and incarceration of Ríos Montt (two goals of traditional 
criminal justice), the transitional message of even an over-
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turned guilty verdict is important. The trial of Pinochet shows 
the impact of transitional justice, even in the absence of a 
guilty verdict: “[a]t the time he was arrested in London in Oc-
tober 1998, the country was divided, . . . [b]ut the international 
condemnation that ensued in 1999 altered public opinion in 
Chile.”265 In the wake of the campaign for international justice 
against Pinochet, “the vast majority of Chileans view Pinochet 
as a dictator, and he has precious little support among the 
younger generation.”266 
Finally, the construction of judicial institutions is clearly 
more likely to occur when defendants are prosecuted in the 
country where the crimes occurred. Guatemala is severely in 
need of stronger judicial institutions. According to a Human 
Rights Watch report, “98 percent of crimes in Guatemala do not 
result in prosecutions. Deficient and corrupt prosecutorial and 
judicial systems, as well as the absence of an effective witness 
protection system, all contribute to this alarmingly low prose-
cution rate.”267 Furthermore, a report by the American Bar As-
sociation Center for Human Rights found that the judicial sys-
tem is regularly used in Guatemala to threaten and intimidate 
human rights defenders.268 As political science professor Anita 
Isaacs stated, “[t]here are islands of democracy here, but it re-
mains a sea of impunity.”269 
In Guatemala, the U.N. Truth Commission and judicial train-
ing programs seem to be contributing to progress. For example, 
information discovered in the police archive in 2005 has led to 
numerous charges against former police officials. In 2011, Hé-
ctor Bol de la Cruz, a former chief of police, was arrested and 
charged with the 1984 disappearance of a twenty-seven-year-
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old student activist. 270  One year earlier, two of his former 
agents were sentenced to forty years in prison based on archive 
evidence that linked them to the same disappearance.271  In 
2012, another former police chief, Pedro García Arredondo, was 
sentenced to seventy years in prison for “orchestrating the kid-
napping of engineering student Edgar Saenz” in 1981;272 and, 
also in 2012, former director of National Police Marlene Raquel 
Blanco Lapola was charged with the extrajudicial killing.273 Re-
cent arrests and convictions demonstrate a strengthening of 
the rule of law in Guatemala. While a great deal of impunity 
still exists, war crimes trials and transitional justice mecha-
nisms are contributing to the development of judicial institu-
tions in Guatemala. 
Ruti Teitel argues that “[t]he transitional normative message 
is most clearly expressed through the international legal order, 
as its strengths are a normative machinery with the capacity to 
comprehend extraordinary political violence deployed outside 
the ordinary legal order.”274 This argument might suggest that 
trials held in international courts would more clearly send the 
message that the conduct of the defendant was something par-
ticularly heinous beyond that found in any “normal” domestic 
trial. While this is a valid point, charging defendants with in-
ternational crimes prohibited by international treaty sends the 
message that such crimes are outside of the domestic criminal 
sphere, even if that crime is prosecuted in a domestic court. 
This is another reason why states must make sure to ratify rel-
evant international treaties and incorporate them into their 
domestic codes; even though defendants could be tried with 
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underlying domestic offense crimes (e.g., murder), the norma-
tive message of a conviction for an international crime (e.g., 
crimes against humanity or genocide) is much stronger.275 
Another drawback of international courts is that they can al-
so be viewed as illegitimate “instrument[s] of hegemony.”276 
This reality, or perception, can seriously limit their ability to 
positively impact society. An aversion to hegemony is justifi-
ably strong in Guatemala; U.S. hegemony during the Cold War 
supported state violence that terrorized the population during 
the Civil War.277 International human rights organizations and 
the U.N. have played a large role in the prosecution, leading 
“defendants and their allies [to] continue to condemn the ‘in-
ternational meddling’ in Guatemalan affairs.” 278  Political 
groups in the country, especially those tied to the military, also 
see the trial as a threat to the current President, Pérez Molina, 
who was in the military in the 1980s and has been implicated 
in numerous crimes. 279  Even in the domestic trial of Ríos 
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In 2011, several human rights organizations presented an Allegation 
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against Perez Molina. Their motion included a widely circulated vid-
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early 1990s, including complicity in the torture and extrajudicial as-
sassination . . .” 
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Montt, the role of the international community was criticized 
on nationalist grounds, and this opposition would have likely 
been even stronger if an international court prosecuted the 
case. 
While Ríos Montt’s crimes occurred more than thirty years 
ago, the transitional message is important because many of the 
problems of that era that were implicated in the case continue 
to this day. While far more Latin American countries are now 
democracies,280 issues of indigenous rights,281 political rights,282 
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ntent-
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see also JUSTICE ON TRIAL, supra note 261, at 1–2 (“The genocide charges 
raised the raw issue of race and ethnicity in a country where the indigenous 
peoples, who census figures say make up about forty percent of the popula-
tion, remain overwhelmingly poor and largely excluded from the highest lev-
els of national government and business.”). 
 282. For example, freedom of the press is a serious concern in Venezuela, 
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can Press Is Losing Its Voice, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/03/19/how-latin-american-press-losing-
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generalized violence,283 and the role of the United States in 
domestic affairs284 remain as some of the most significant is-
sues facing the region. For this reason, the trial and judgment 
are not just about the past, but also about the present and fu-
ture. 
In terms of transitional justice, domestic courts where the 
genocide occurred should definitely prosecute crimes. The goals 
of seeking the truth, establishing the rule of law, and promot-
ing societal reconciliation can only be achieved by actively en-
gaging the society where the crimes occurred. While interna-
tional tribunals and domestic courts exercising universal juris-
diction can achieve these goals to some extent, the society 
where the crimes occurred must engage in the process for it to 
have any lasting impact. 
IV. TENSIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
Jurisdiction and the goals of transitional justice clearly favor 
domestic prosecution. However, international courts and do-
mestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction could better 
meet international standards and be more effective with regard 
to fair trial and due process rights. 
At the same time, this divide is not absolute. For example, it 
is difficult to promote rule of law institutions without respect 
for defendants’ and victims’ rights. While there may be a ten-
sion, which leads to trade-offs, none of these factors can be ig-
nored. Teitel argues this point: 
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points to 
[c]ountries where criminal violence, often driven by drug-trafficking 
rivalries, has spiraled so completely out of control as to have weak-
ened press freedom, rule of law, and other democratic indicators. 
Mexico . . . is the principal example. Drug-related violence has also 
retarded the growth of democratic institutions in El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. 
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 284. See Christopher Sabatini, Rethinking Latin America, FOREIGN AFF., 
Mar./Apr. 2012, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137101/christopher-
sabatini/rethinking-latin-america. 
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For trials to realize their constructive potential, they need to 
be prosecuted in keeping with the full legality associated with 
working democracies during ordinary times, and when they 
are not conducted in a visibly fair way, the very same trials 
can backfire, risking the wrong message of political justice 
and threatening a fledgling liberal state.285 
Adopting an intermediary approach, such as regional criminal 
law enforcement, could mitigate these tensions.286 According to 
Burke-White, “[s]upranational tribunals are often unwieldy, 
expensive, and both physically and psychologically distant from 
the particular crimes in question. National courts, while less 
expensive to administer and closer to the events in question, 
often lack judicial resources and run the risk of bias.”287 
Latin America should thus consider a regional criminal 
court.288 Latin American and Caribbean countries have already 
largely embraced international criminal justice;289 as of Sep-
tember 2013, twenty-six countries in the regions have ratified 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.290 Both 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an organ of the 
Organization of American States (“OAS”) based in San José, 
Costa Rica,291 and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
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Rights, another OAS institution based in Washington, D.C.,292 
already investigate and adjudicate regional human rights com-
plaints. Alexandra Huneeus recently argued that the Inter-
American human rights system is also already “developing 
quasi-criminal review”293 by “order[ing] and supervis[ing] na-
tional prosecutions.”294 The fact that the stalled genocide trial 
in Guatemala has just been referred to the Inter-American 
Commission confirms this view.  
A regional criminal court would be a durable institution that 
promotes the rule of law through accountability for interna-
tional crimes in the region. Such a court would also provide a 
means by which criminals could be tried in a forum that is 
close to home, but would be less biased by a domestic political 
system. Possible candidates for prosecution include Inocente 
Orlando Montano from El Salvador,295 Juan Carlos Bonilla Val-
ladares from Honduras,296 and Alesio Gutiérrez from Nicara-
gua.297 However, such a court may not be established for some 
time given current tensions in the inter-American system,298 
                                                                                                             
 292. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ORG. AM. STS., 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
 293. Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The 
Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 4 (2013). 
 294. Id. at 1. 
 295. See Milton J. Valencia, Salvadorian Convicted of Immigration Fraud, 
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/09/11/former-salvadoran-official-
convicted-immigration-fraud-boston-sought-spain-war-crimes-
charges/q0rTPruik4sLU8x9ESfByJ/story.html (“A former Salvadoran mili-
tary commander pleaded guilty Tuesday in federal court to lying to immigra-
tion authorities so that he could stay in the United States, a move that could 
aid Spanish authorities who are seeking to have him extradited to that coun-
try to face war crimes charges.”). 
 296. See Katherine Corcoran & Martha Mendoza, Juan Carlos Bonilla Val-
ladares, Honduras Police Chief, Investigated in Killings, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/juan-carlos-bonilla-
valla_n_1562328.html. 
 297. Victoria Sanford, Victory in Guatemala? Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/its-too-soon-to-declare-
victory-in-guatemalan-genocide.html?pagewanted=2. 
 298. See Ignacio Boulin, Challenges to the Inter-American Human Rights 
System, HARV. INT’L. L.J. DIG., Dec. 16, 2013, 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2013/12/challenges-to-the-inter-american-human-
rights-system/; In Depth: OAS General Assembly, AM. Q., 
612 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
recent reforms to inter-American institutions,299  and a still-
developing ICC. In the near future, domestic prosecution of in-
ternational crimes under territorial and universal jurisdiction 
will likely continue in cases where ICC referral is neither legal-
ly nor politically feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether domestic courts should prosecute 
genocide is not answered with a simple “yes” or “no.” Instead, a 
number of complex factors need to be considered in evaluating 
the forum for genocide prosecution, including jurisdiction, vic-
tims’ and defendants’ rights, and transitional justice. In terms 
of promoting the goals of transitional justice, the strongest fo-
rum is domestic. However, risks associated with a domestic 
court prosecution must also be taken into account. 
The recent trial of Ríos Montt in Guatemala illustrates this 
tension. While the forum in a domestic court clearly provided 
the greatest transitional benefits to Guatemalan society, the 
court was not able to convict Ríos Montt despite an overwhelm-
ing body of evidence.300 The case remains pending, however, 
and a final guilty verdict might still be possible. Regional crim-
inal law enforcement mechanisms offer an attractive possible 
solution to the domestic-international forum problem; however, 
the factors addressed in this Article should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. In the future, international law must pro-
tect human rights using a number of tools, including domestic 
mechanisms, guided by international principles, and with the 
attention and contribution of the international community. 
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